Well, I certainly can't remember a more anticipated EC. But ultimately I'm disappointed with this document.
The big headline outcomes are a new bailout for Greece, voluntary private sector involvement in Greece's debt crisis is to be pursued, extension of the loan-terms for all 3 program countries, as well as a loosening of EFSF rules to allow it provide support to countries that are not in a program.
Extending the terms of the loans was regretfully necessary. The idea that the program countries will be going back to the markets in the next couple of years has lost all credibility. This much I concede was unavoidable.
The involvement of the private sector is a good idea (if it is done with a moderate hand). European Governments (and especially the program countries) are financially exhausted and it is important to ease the pressure somewhat by shifting some of this assumed responsibility back to the original risk-takers. Besides, after 4 years of turbulence, anyone still holding Greek bonds is probably a speculator anyway and it is highly unlikely that any truly fragile financial institution is still exposed to a Greek default. We will probably find that a moderate default will have very little financial impact. However, I find the part of the document dealing with private sector involvement vague. It states that private sector involvement will be voluntary, citing willingness on the parts of investors to roll over Greek debts. But it is doubtful that they are volunteering to do anything greater than this. Rolling over debts is well and good, but frankly it doesn't really relieve the Member States.
However, my greatest problem with the deal is in its loosening of the rules of the EFSF/ESM. The idea of lending to countries that are not in a recovery program seems obviously silly -all the expense and none of the reform -who could argue that's a good idea? A reform program is the necessary exit strategy from providing support to Member States. It is indispensible. If Member States have to be bailed out, then we need to map a route for them to stand on their own feet again, or else we will end up with a proper transfer union.
I doubt that will ever be allowed to happen, neither the lenders nor the borrowers want it. So it appears to me that this is some sort of a PR stunt to reassure markets that IT and ES will be allowed access EFSF funding without having the humiliation or terms of a bailout. These countries may gain some short-term, pre-crisis credibility because of the access to credit this brings, but noone could argue this would be a good idea if we decided to do it in practice. Not only would we be sacrificing the reforms that rightly come with access to bailout money, but this change could (and I stress could) create expectations of the EFSF being used as a mechanism for some sort of transfer union.
The whole idea of the ESM was to create a mini-IMF for the Eurozone, bailing out countries on the condition of mending their credit positions. This proposal nominally drifts way beyond this. This is not rehabilitation, it is artificially cheap credit -the source of all our woes. Taxpayers may be willing to assist their neighbours to turn around their situations, but they will quickly squash any notion of paying for the indebted countries to carry on with business as usual. Frankly I'm surprised it has been even made it onto this document.
There is also provision for the ESM to dabble in secondary markets. This could be a very useful policy tool if it is used to involve the private sector in debt reductions, but seemingly it is only permissible with the agreement of each MS and the ECB. One must wonder then why it was necessary to include it in this document if it can only be used when everyone is in agreement -more spindoctoring?
Finally, the new Greek bailout. Unavoidable in my opinion, but it has to be properly funded. While the document promises big on the involvement of the private sector, I have already expressed some doubts about this. I will go further. The document also calls on the IMF to participate in the new bailout. I do not think it is incredible to suspect that the IMF may decline to involve itself without more private sector involvement. That would be a quite incredible humiliation for everyone involved, but right now, I would not rule it out.
So my verdict is that the only people that got what they wanted were the Irish. The concessions on our interest rate and also on the term of our loans, alongside the modest burning of financial bondholders, fiscal austerity and the gradual recapitalisation of our banks means that Ireland is now in a much better position than 3 years ago. Though it is not smooth sailing from here, it is likely that Ireland will begin to make a recovery in the next 2 years and recover strongly soon after. Doubtless the banks will still require more capital (even though we have sworn on our honour that we tested them properly this time), but the whole mess seems more manageable these days. Economic reforms scheduled under our bailout deal will go further to getting us out of Dodge.
But the concessions to the program countries on the terms of their loans, does not in any way compensate for the lack of hard details on the Greek bailout, or the fudging of the role of the EFSF. Though markets have reacted well today, I am not satisfied with this deal and fear it is based substantially on wishful thinking and fuzzy economics. Frankly, we need to cluck at this text and tell them all to try again.
Markets are not the measure of these deals. Markets rise and fall on the self-interest of investors. Rising markets in response to more public stimulus is unsurprising -not a true yardstick of the effectiveness of policy.
TEXT of the Deal:
Greece:
1. We welcome the measures undertaken by the Greek government to stabilize public finances
and reform the economy as well as the new package of measures including privatisation
recently adopted by the Greek Parliament. These are unprecedented, but necessary, efforts to
bring the Greek economy back on a sustainable growth path. We are conscious of the efforts
that the adjustment measures entail for the Greek citizens, and are convinced that these
sacrifices are indispensable for economic recovery and will contribute to the future stability
and welfare of the country.
2. We agree to support a new programme for Greece and, together with the IMF and the
voluntary contribution of the private sector, to fully cover the financing gap. The total official
financing will amount to an estimated 109 billion euro. This programme will be designed,
notably through lower interest rates and extended maturities, to decisively improve the debt
sustainability and refinancing profile of Greece. We call on the IMF to continue to contribute
to the financing of the new Greek programme. We intend to use the EFSF as the financing
vehicle for the next disbursement. We will monitor very closely the strict implementation of
the programme based on the regular assessment by the Commission in liaison with the ECB
and the IMF.
3. We have decided to lengthen the maturity of future EFSF loans to Greece to the maximum
extent possible from the current 7.5 years to a minimum of 15 years and up to 30 years with a
grace period of 10 years. In this context, we will ensure adequate post programme monitoring.
We will provide EFSF loans at lending rates equivalent to those of the Balance of Payments
facility (currently approx. 3.5%), close to, without going below, the EFSF funding cost. We
also decided to extend substantially the maturities of the existing Greek facility. This will be
accompanied by a mechanism which ensures appropriate incentives to implement the
programme.
4. We call for a comprehensive strategy for growth and investment in Greece. We welcome the
Commission’s decision to create a Task Force which will work with the Greek authorities to
target the structural funds on competitiveness and growth, job creation and training. We will
mobilise EU funds and institutions such as the EIB towards this goal and relaunch the Greek
economy. Member States and the Commission will immediately mobilize all resources
necessary in order to provide exceptional technical assistance to help Greece implement its
reforms. The Commission will report on progress in this respect in October.
5. The financial sector has indicated its willingness to support Greece on a voluntary basis
through a menu of options further strengthening overall sustainability. The net contribution of
the private sector is estimated at 37 billion euro.
underpin the quality of collateral so as to allow its continued use for access to Eurosystem
liquidity operations by Greek banks. We will provide adequate resources to recapitalise Greek
banks if needed.
1 Credit enhancement will be provided to 1
debt buy back programme will contribute to 12.6 billion euro, bringing the total to 50 billion
euro. For the period 2011-2019, the total net contribution of the private sector involvement is
estimated at 106 billion euro.
Taking into account the cost of credit enhancement for the period 2011-2014. In addition, a Private sector involvement:
6. As far as our general approach to private sector involvement in the euro area is concerned, we
would like to make it clear that Greece requires an exceptional and unique solution.
7. All other euro countries solemnly reaffirm their inflexible determination to honour fully their
own individual sovereign signature and all their commitments to sustainable fiscal conditions
and structural reforms. The euro area Heads of State or Government fully support this
determination as the credibility of all their sovereign signatures is a decisive element for
ensuring financial stability in the euro area as a whole.
Stabilization tools:
8. To improve the effectiveness of the EFSF and of the ESM and address contagion, we agree to
increase their flexibility linked to appropriate conditionality, allowing them to:
- act on the basis of a precautionary programme;
- finance recapitalisation of financial institutions through loans to governments including
in non programme countries ;
- intervene in the secondary markets on the basis of an ECB analysis recognizing the
existence of exceptional financial market circumstances and risks to financial stability
and on the basis of a decision by mutual agreement of the EFSF/ESM Member States,
to avoid contagion.
We will initiate the necessary procedures for the implementation of these decisions as soon as
possible.
9. Where appropriate, a collateral arrangement will be put in place so as to cover the risk arising
to euro area Member States from their guarantees to the EFSF.
Fiscal consolidation and growth in the euro area:
10. We are determined to continue to provide support to countries under programmes until they
have regained market access, provided they successfully implement those programmes. We
welcome Ireland and Portugal's resolve to strictly implement their programmes and reiterate
our strong commitment to the success of these programmes. The EFSF lending rates and
maturities we agreed upon for Greece will be applied also for Portugal and Ireland. In this
context, we note Ireland's willingness to participate constructively in the discussions on the
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base draft directive (CCCTB) and in the structured
discussions on tax policy issues in the framework of the Euro+ Pact framework.
11. All euro area Member States will adhere strictly to the agreed fiscal targets, improve
competitiveness and address macro-economic imbalances. Public deficits in all countries
except those under a programme will be brought below 3% by 2013 at the latest. In this
context, we welcome the budgetary package recently presented by the Italian government
which will enable it to bring the deficit below 3% in 2012 and to achieve balance budget in
2014. We also welcome the ambitious reforms undertaken by Spain in the fiscal, financial and
structural area. As a follow up to the results of bank stress tests, Member States will provide
backstops to banks as appropriate.
12. We will implement the recommendations adopted in June for reforms that will enhance our
growth. We invite the Commission and the EIB to enhance the synergies between loan
programmes and EU funds in all countries under EU/IMF assistance. We support all efforts to
improve their capacity to absorb EU funds in order to stimulate growth and employment,
including through a temporary increase in co-financing rates.
Economic governance:
13. We call for the rapid finalization of the legislative package on the strengthening of the
Stability and Growth Pact and the new macro economic surveillance. Euro area members will
fully support the Polish Presidency in order to reach agreement with the European Parliament
on voting rules in the preventive arm of the Pact.
14. We commit to introduce by the end of 2012 national fiscal frameworks as foreseen in the
fiscal frameworks directive.
15. We agree that reliance on external credit ratings in the EU regulatory framework should be
reduced, taking into account the Commission's recent proposals in that direction, and we look
forward to the Commission proposals on credit ratings agencies.
16. We invite the President of the European Council, in close consultation with the President of
the Commission and the President of the Eurogroup, to make concrete proposals by October
on how to improve working methods and enhance crisis management in the euro area.. COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION
Brussels, 21 July 2011
STATEMENT BY THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT OF THE EURO AREA
AND EU INSTITUTIONS
We reaffirm our commitment to the euro and to do whatever is needed to ensure the financial
stability of the euro area as a whole and its Member States. We also reaffirm our determination to
reinforce convergence, competitiveness and governance in the euro area. Since the beginning of the
sovereign debt crisis, important measures have been taken to stabilize the euro area, reform the
rules and develop new stabilization tools. The recovery in the euro area is well on track and the euro
is based on sound economic fundamentals. But the challenges at hand have shown the need for
more far reaching measures.
Today, we agreed on the following measures:
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