The concept of a universal speed limit depends on the idea that massless particles can travel extremely fast without needing massive energy to move them. As energy and mass are relative and functions of a constant (E=MC2), there is a trade off between the two and all matter falls somewhere on a spectrum between being highly energetic with low mass, and being massive without energy. It has been assumed that light travels at the maximum possible speed as it is unburdened by mass.
However, it has been known for some time that light does indeed have a mass, it is effected by gravity (albeit only slightly). Furthermore, it can impart kinetic energy (the concept behind lightsails).
It therefore seems obvious to me that if light has a mass, it is not pure energy and cannot move at the universal speed limit. Perhaps nothing does, but if recent observations are anything to go by, seemingly neutrinos come closer than light.
Thursday, December 8, 2011
The "crunch" Eurozone deal will destroy what little hope is left for saving our currency.
As I write, Europe's leaders are gathered in France and Belgium to agree fiscal restraints, in the hope that this will encourage the ECB to finally come to the rescue with sufficient liquidity to make a difference.
However, their plan is fatally flawed. I do not disagree with fiscal restraints in principle, but in the common currency Eurozone area they are going to end what chance the currency has of surviving. The Eurozone's problem is not that certain countries have been profligate, rather it was the wrong countries that were profligate. In the run up to the present crisis, those countries at the top of their economic cycle were running balance of payments deficits and those countries which which were struggling under economic adjustments were running balance of payments surpluses. This is a natural feature of human nature: when times are bad you want to work to improve your situation, when times are good, you feel confident to let things go a bit.
But imposing a fiscal straight jacket on EZ countries is not the solution, our members are locked into an inappropriate monetary policy and only have fiscal measures to compensate. The ability to borrow "appropriately" to stabilise economic cycles is not necessarily a bad thing.
The one size fits all monetary policy of the ECB meant that the boom countries could not rely on monetary policy to rein in their economies, just as the slower-growing countries wanted a more liberal monetary policy. We effectively removed a tool of economic adjustment. If we had been wise, we would have used fiscal policy to compensate for these stresses, but that's all history now. But now, we are proposing to impose restraints on our fiscal policys, limiting the only remaining tool for intervening in the economy. How this is supposed to make the Eurozone more stable is a mystery. This can only work if state profligacy was the problem all along. In some boom countries, state profligacy did occur, but it was the result of inappropriately loose monetary policy. Fiscal union is the correct solution for profligacy, but profligacy is not the problem. This plan is the answer of those who do not really understand what has happened.
In other peripheral countries, where fiscal profligacy was eschewed, the result was massive private borrowing, fuelling asset bubbles (such as Ireland and Spain). Public spending in these countries, was if anything more restrained than in the core countries that have come through this crisis best. By imposing rigorous fiscal rules on all EZ countries, we will avert future Greeces and Italys, but because we fail to address the real problem, we will spawn a series of Ireland's and Spains. This proposed plan will spell the end of the common currency within a generation.
This policy may serve a political purpose, but it does not fix the eurozone -nothing but a transfer union can fix the Euro. I personally don't want to see this and think we should seek to leave this currency at the first opportunity. Though I'm a europhile, I think it's time to kiss goodbye to a common currency.
However, their plan is fatally flawed. I do not disagree with fiscal restraints in principle, but in the common currency Eurozone area they are going to end what chance the currency has of surviving. The Eurozone's problem is not that certain countries have been profligate, rather it was the wrong countries that were profligate. In the run up to the present crisis, those countries at the top of their economic cycle were running balance of payments deficits and those countries which which were struggling under economic adjustments were running balance of payments surpluses. This is a natural feature of human nature: when times are bad you want to work to improve your situation, when times are good, you feel confident to let things go a bit.
But imposing a fiscal straight jacket on EZ countries is not the solution, our members are locked into an inappropriate monetary policy and only have fiscal measures to compensate. The ability to borrow "appropriately" to stabilise economic cycles is not necessarily a bad thing.
The one size fits all monetary policy of the ECB meant that the boom countries could not rely on monetary policy to rein in their economies, just as the slower-growing countries wanted a more liberal monetary policy. We effectively removed a tool of economic adjustment. If we had been wise, we would have used fiscal policy to compensate for these stresses, but that's all history now. But now, we are proposing to impose restraints on our fiscal policys, limiting the only remaining tool for intervening in the economy. How this is supposed to make the Eurozone more stable is a mystery. This can only work if state profligacy was the problem all along. In some boom countries, state profligacy did occur, but it was the result of inappropriately loose monetary policy. Fiscal union is the correct solution for profligacy, but profligacy is not the problem. This plan is the answer of those who do not really understand what has happened.
In other peripheral countries, where fiscal profligacy was eschewed, the result was massive private borrowing, fuelling asset bubbles (such as Ireland and Spain). Public spending in these countries, was if anything more restrained than in the core countries that have come through this crisis best. By imposing rigorous fiscal rules on all EZ countries, we will avert future Greeces and Italys, but because we fail to address the real problem, we will spawn a series of Ireland's and Spains. This proposed plan will spell the end of the common currency within a generation.
This policy may serve a political purpose, but it does not fix the eurozone -nothing but a transfer union can fix the Euro. I personally don't want to see this and think we should seek to leave this currency at the first opportunity. Though I'm a europhile, I think it's time to kiss goodbye to a common currency.
Friday, December 2, 2011
We are Church
In recent weeks, a new group has sprung up in Ireland. We are Church is a group of reform minded, lay catholics, present in several countries. They criticise aspects of church doctrine, but crucially they do this as practicing catholics.
http://we-are-church-ireland.org/
Though this can hardly be described as a revolution in people power, nonetheless this is a very positive form of criticism which the church would do well to listen to. These people are not doctrinally or ideologically opposed to catholicism, they are not intent on damaging the church -rather, they are committed to the church's wellbeing and are voicing concern about harmful aspects of current doctrine which are not rooted in fundamental tenets of catholicism, needlessly harming the church and its members.
Their fundamental aim is to involve the lay in decisionmaking, and to this end they have avoided defining their stance on many issues (it would make no sense to combat doctrine by creating a new doctrine for their members) -yet they have managed to agree broadly amongst all their members on a limited number of issues they intend to collectively campaign for.
1.The equality of all the baptised where decision making is actively shared by all, with appropriate structures for this.
2. Full participation of women in all aspects of church life, including priesthood.
3. Removal of the obligation of clerical celibacy.
4. A positive attitude toward sexuality and recognition of the primacy of an informed conscience.
5. An inclusive church, open and welcoming to all, which does not marginalise its own people i.e. divorced, in second relationships, those who are gay or lesbian.
Reading this list of very reasonable reforms, I can't help feeling that this group is very badly needed. None of these problems of life inside the catholic church is based in scripture -they are all inferred from a selective interpretation of the bible and an overreaching catechism that is based more on mortal opinions than divine will. These problems stem from mortal prejudice rather than divine intolerance.
That these problems can drift on unaddressed is an indictment of the way doctrine is made. Successive Ecumenical Councils have added more and more mortal norms to catholicism that have nothing to do with the religion left by Christ. Many of these mortal norms are now outdated and discredited, they damage the church but they drift on unaltered. The reason these problems have gone unaddressed is because nobody that counts is opposed to them. We are church could be the start of a forum to make the church authorities sit up and take notice that their followers are upset with their insistence on arcane rules that are not really related to the faith. I wish this new group all the best in their broad endeavour to claim back the catholic church for all the faithful. A simpler, narrower interpretation of christian living that is based exclusively on scripture, rather than ecumenical interpretation is the objective. The Beatitudes, the Gospels and to a lesser extent the wider new testament should be the only basis for doctrine.
Apostolic succession is probably the main obstacle to the success of a group such as We are Church. If catholics are to believe that the church authorities are appointed by divine will, then there is no scope for them to oppose church authorities. But if this notion is challenged (and implicitly this seems to be embedded in their first issue regarding the equality of all catholics in decisionmaking for the church), then the flood gates of reform could burst open. I wish them well, I wish the church well.
http://we-are-church-ireland.org/
Though this can hardly be described as a revolution in people power, nonetheless this is a very positive form of criticism which the church would do well to listen to. These people are not doctrinally or ideologically opposed to catholicism, they are not intent on damaging the church -rather, they are committed to the church's wellbeing and are voicing concern about harmful aspects of current doctrine which are not rooted in fundamental tenets of catholicism, needlessly harming the church and its members.
Their fundamental aim is to involve the lay in decisionmaking, and to this end they have avoided defining their stance on many issues (it would make no sense to combat doctrine by creating a new doctrine for their members) -yet they have managed to agree broadly amongst all their members on a limited number of issues they intend to collectively campaign for.
1.The equality of all the baptised where decision making is actively shared by all, with appropriate structures for this.
2. Full participation of women in all aspects of church life, including priesthood.
3. Removal of the obligation of clerical celibacy.
4. A positive attitude toward sexuality and recognition of the primacy of an informed conscience.
5. An inclusive church, open and welcoming to all, which does not marginalise its own people i.e. divorced, in second relationships, those who are gay or lesbian.
Reading this list of very reasonable reforms, I can't help feeling that this group is very badly needed. None of these problems of life inside the catholic church is based in scripture -they are all inferred from a selective interpretation of the bible and an overreaching catechism that is based more on mortal opinions than divine will. These problems stem from mortal prejudice rather than divine intolerance.
That these problems can drift on unaddressed is an indictment of the way doctrine is made. Successive Ecumenical Councils have added more and more mortal norms to catholicism that have nothing to do with the religion left by Christ. Many of these mortal norms are now outdated and discredited, they damage the church but they drift on unaltered. The reason these problems have gone unaddressed is because nobody that counts is opposed to them. We are church could be the start of a forum to make the church authorities sit up and take notice that their followers are upset with their insistence on arcane rules that are not really related to the faith. I wish this new group all the best in their broad endeavour to claim back the catholic church for all the faithful. A simpler, narrower interpretation of christian living that is based exclusively on scripture, rather than ecumenical interpretation is the objective. The Beatitudes, the Gospels and to a lesser extent the wider new testament should be the only basis for doctrine.
Apostolic succession is probably the main obstacle to the success of a group such as We are Church. If catholics are to believe that the church authorities are appointed by divine will, then there is no scope for them to oppose church authorities. But if this notion is challenged (and implicitly this seems to be embedded in their first issue regarding the equality of all catholics in decisionmaking for the church), then the flood gates of reform could burst open. I wish them well, I wish the church well.
Wednesday, November 30, 2011
The IMF's role/roll
I am extremely relieved that there is now finally, serious talk of allowing the IMF come into the Eurozone (EZ). Up until now, our policy efforts have been to do everything possible to avert the IMF coming into the EZ. We have even gone so far as to develop a mini-IMF within Europe (EFSF/ESM) to perform the necessary tasks without giving over control to this global institution. (Note: despite their involvement in the bailouts of Greece/Portugal/Ireland, the IMF is not in control of these programs, it is merely providing technical support and limited funding).
However, I have always thought this was a mistake. I have written to countless heads of State, Commissioners etc. expressing my disbelief that they have gone to such lengths to prevent the IMF coming in and performing the necessary tasks. They have built up mighty institutions, destroyed countless billions of wealth and worst of all wasted precious time for reform in their efforts to stave off the IMF's advances.
I can remember clearly the first person to rule out IMF involvement -Jean Claude Trichet; he said that having the IMF intervene in a Eurozone country would be a humiliation. I did not think then and I do not think now that that was appropriate language for a central bank governor to use -emotive, unengaged, and truculent. I regard it as the key mistake made at a European level. I have since written to countless people trying to highlight the absurdity and vainglory of what we are trying to do. Only Olli Rehn took the trouble to respond to me, simply saying that the IMF had insufficient funds to rescue Greece (which seems absurd, when you think about the resources we have given to the EFSF since).
The real reason for all of this dissembling, was that European leaders know, that the first thing the IMF will do is tell the countries in severe debt that they must first write down a great deal of it. This will cause losses to private investors throughout the region, many of them institutional investors such as pension funds. I fully understand the reluctance to expose these institutions to losses -however, after 3 years of this farcical dancing around the IMF, can anyone seriously say that going to the IMF would be worse? Furthermore, by now, the truly vulnerable institutions such as pension funds, deposit banks etc. have sold their stakes in these bonds and the current bondholders for the PIGS are mostly high-risk investors -such as hedge funds. Defaulting on these will not cause the cataclysm our leaders fear.
I am delighted to hear that finally, people are talking of the IMF taking control of this process, instead of this Frankfurt group which has grown up in recent months. The IMF has the expertise, the credibility (and with ECB support, the firepower) to fix these multiple crises. It will look at solving the problem and will not have to look over its shoulder at national bondholer interests or coalition partners. I hope this suggestion gathers momentum.
My father used to tell me that if you get the economics right the politics will look after itself. I have come over the years to invert this wisdom -once you get the politics right, the economics fall into line pretty quickly. We need to get rid of this dysfunctional system of politicians from other jurisdictions deciding what is economically best for the troubled countries. The IMF is no more democratic or accountable than the Frankfurt group, but at least their agenda is not set by bondholders or domestic elections. If they come in, then we can really start to work at putting all this horror behind us.
However, I have always thought this was a mistake. I have written to countless heads of State, Commissioners etc. expressing my disbelief that they have gone to such lengths to prevent the IMF coming in and performing the necessary tasks. They have built up mighty institutions, destroyed countless billions of wealth and worst of all wasted precious time for reform in their efforts to stave off the IMF's advances.
I can remember clearly the first person to rule out IMF involvement -Jean Claude Trichet; he said that having the IMF intervene in a Eurozone country would be a humiliation. I did not think then and I do not think now that that was appropriate language for a central bank governor to use -emotive, unengaged, and truculent. I regard it as the key mistake made at a European level. I have since written to countless people trying to highlight the absurdity and vainglory of what we are trying to do. Only Olli Rehn took the trouble to respond to me, simply saying that the IMF had insufficient funds to rescue Greece (which seems absurd, when you think about the resources we have given to the EFSF since).
The real reason for all of this dissembling, was that European leaders know, that the first thing the IMF will do is tell the countries in severe debt that they must first write down a great deal of it. This will cause losses to private investors throughout the region, many of them institutional investors such as pension funds. I fully understand the reluctance to expose these institutions to losses -however, after 3 years of this farcical dancing around the IMF, can anyone seriously say that going to the IMF would be worse? Furthermore, by now, the truly vulnerable institutions such as pension funds, deposit banks etc. have sold their stakes in these bonds and the current bondholders for the PIGS are mostly high-risk investors -such as hedge funds. Defaulting on these will not cause the cataclysm our leaders fear.
I am delighted to hear that finally, people are talking of the IMF taking control of this process, instead of this Frankfurt group which has grown up in recent months. The IMF has the expertise, the credibility (and with ECB support, the firepower) to fix these multiple crises. It will look at solving the problem and will not have to look over its shoulder at national bondholer interests or coalition partners. I hope this suggestion gathers momentum.
My father used to tell me that if you get the economics right the politics will look after itself. I have come over the years to invert this wisdom -once you get the politics right, the economics fall into line pretty quickly. We need to get rid of this dysfunctional system of politicians from other jurisdictions deciding what is economically best for the troubled countries. The IMF is no more democratic or accountable than the Frankfurt group, but at least their agenda is not set by bondholders or domestic elections. If they come in, then we can really start to work at putting all this horror behind us.
Eurozone crisis non-solutions
A broader mandate for the ECB is not just the most desirable resolution to this crisis -it is by now the only solution to the crisis.
The ongoing debate about the way forward to resolve the Eurozone crisis is being hampered by a series of non-solutions that are being flogged by different parties. These false solutions do not help with resolving the crisis, but instead reflect existing national bias'. It is a toxic brew of lazy thinking and flippancy.
I intend to address a few in turn. Eurobonds; closer budgetary scrutiny; treaty change.
EUROBONDS.
Many commentators have spoken for Eurobonds, claiming that they will extend the creditworthiness of the Eurozone as a whole to each country, allowing those currently locked out of the markets to borrow. There are well rehearsed and real problems with this, in particular, that it will reward the profligate at the expense of the prudent and encourage further bad behaviour. It will in fact return us to the same pattern of misaligned incentives that amplified the problem in the first place. This alone should be enough to rule this approach out of consideration (though Ireland, typically unsure what to do, is actually supporting this daftness), but it is moot as far as I'm concerned, because apart from the problems of agency -it just won't work.
The Eurobonds idea creates an ultra safe investment asset for MSs to sell, up to the value of 60% of their GDP. It also accepts that national bonds sold after this are potentially defaultable (though why it would be more acceptable for this to happen after common European debt has been issued as opposed to now is a bit of a mystery). As most of the troubled countries have existing debts far greater than 60% of GDP, as they borrow, they will be making their existing debts increasingly risky, and expendable. In effect, Eurobonds will put an end to national bonds, only Eurobonds will be sellable, and once troubled MSs have sold 60% of their GDP's worth of Eurobonds, they will be unable to issue national debt to refinance their remaining loans -we will be back to square one. Eurobonds are a red herring.
CLOSER BUDGETARY SCRUTINY
I am not opposed to closer European budgetary scrutiny. Indeed in Ireland, it would be refreshing to have any budgetary scrutiny at all. However, this plan will not help the current crisis. Firstly, it presupposes that the external controls on national budgets will prevent financial disasters such as happened in Ireland and Spain. Given the excellent fiscal status of both Spain and Ireland in the years running up to the crisis, it is difficult to see what budgetary scrutiny would have changed. Low debts, high surpluses -just what are we to believe budgetary scrutiny would have done? In Greece, the statistics were falsified to obscure the truth -what would scrutiny have achieved here? Indeed, the countries that have come through this crisis best are those which consistently ran deficits in the run up to the crisis. It may perform some political function to allow central European politicians sell the upcoming losses to their electorates, but it serves no real purpose in the current crisis. Closer budgetary scrutiny is a red herring.
TREATY CHANGE
Treaty change is quite impossible in a useful timeframe -furthermore, the ratification process will introduce a new aspect of uncertainty into an already volatile situation. In particular, the likelihood of the UK passing a referendum on closer economic cooperation with the dysfunctional Eurozone is remote. Significant treaty changes will lead us into a world of pitfalls that we must avoid. Treaty change is a red herring.
QUANTITATIVE EASING
I have been quite a fan of quantitative easing in the US and the UK. I have a long standing belief that a small amount of inflation is a very healthy thing as it prevents money hoarding and compels wealth to be invested productively and profitably. In short it prevents depressions. Quantitative easing involves the Central Bank printing money, and then using this new cash to purchase government debts. The new liquidity released into the system creates a stimulus and prevents deflation. In a highly leveraged economy (such as Ireland), deflation is the path to disaster.
Nonetheless, at present in the Eurozone, inflation is running at over 2%, so deflation is not a problem except in certain localities. This does not bode well for the consequences of QE.
However, this will not last for long as forced austerity is probably going to descend on the continent once national budgets are agreed in December. Inflation will likely tick downwards as austerity bites, and perhaps then Quantitative Easing can be used to ease the money supply and relieve the debts of Greece. Finally, it must be made clear that this is a once off, and we must convince markets, funds etc. that the next time there is a sovereign crisis in Europe, they will have to eat their losses. A first step towards this would be to prevent financial institutions from using sovereign bonds as Tier 1 capital. Increasing their risk exposure to these assets should concentrate minds.
However, that is not an end to it -Quantitative Easing poses particular problems in the Eurozone. As it is a common currency, all holders of Euros across the Eurozone will lose wealth as the supply of money expands, while all indebted persons will benefit from the reduction in the value of their debts, and the proceeds from this money printing will be used to relieve the national debts of just a handful of highly indebted countries (or probably only Greece). This is undoubtedly unfair. It rewards personal and national bad behaviour and could be seen to give encouragement to the profligate.
However, unlike the other solutions currently being discussed -it will work. It is not a red herring, it is a real solution, and therefore, for all its lack of appeal, I support this approach. Combined with a coordinated austerity drive to balance Eurozone budgets, Quantitative Easing will increase the money supply, relieve the debt burden of Greece cause only modest, controllable inflation and save the Euro.
The ongoing debate about the way forward to resolve the Eurozone crisis is being hampered by a series of non-solutions that are being flogged by different parties. These false solutions do not help with resolving the crisis, but instead reflect existing national bias'. It is a toxic brew of lazy thinking and flippancy.
I intend to address a few in turn. Eurobonds; closer budgetary scrutiny; treaty change.
EUROBONDS.
Many commentators have spoken for Eurobonds, claiming that they will extend the creditworthiness of the Eurozone as a whole to each country, allowing those currently locked out of the markets to borrow. There are well rehearsed and real problems with this, in particular, that it will reward the profligate at the expense of the prudent and encourage further bad behaviour. It will in fact return us to the same pattern of misaligned incentives that amplified the problem in the first place. This alone should be enough to rule this approach out of consideration (though Ireland, typically unsure what to do, is actually supporting this daftness), but it is moot as far as I'm concerned, because apart from the problems of agency -it just won't work.
The Eurobonds idea creates an ultra safe investment asset for MSs to sell, up to the value of 60% of their GDP. It also accepts that national bonds sold after this are potentially defaultable (though why it would be more acceptable for this to happen after common European debt has been issued as opposed to now is a bit of a mystery). As most of the troubled countries have existing debts far greater than 60% of GDP, as they borrow, they will be making their existing debts increasingly risky, and expendable. In effect, Eurobonds will put an end to national bonds, only Eurobonds will be sellable, and once troubled MSs have sold 60% of their GDP's worth of Eurobonds, they will be unable to issue national debt to refinance their remaining loans -we will be back to square one. Eurobonds are a red herring.
CLOSER BUDGETARY SCRUTINY
I am not opposed to closer European budgetary scrutiny. Indeed in Ireland, it would be refreshing to have any budgetary scrutiny at all. However, this plan will not help the current crisis. Firstly, it presupposes that the external controls on national budgets will prevent financial disasters such as happened in Ireland and Spain. Given the excellent fiscal status of both Spain and Ireland in the years running up to the crisis, it is difficult to see what budgetary scrutiny would have changed. Low debts, high surpluses -just what are we to believe budgetary scrutiny would have done? In Greece, the statistics were falsified to obscure the truth -what would scrutiny have achieved here? Indeed, the countries that have come through this crisis best are those which consistently ran deficits in the run up to the crisis. It may perform some political function to allow central European politicians sell the upcoming losses to their electorates, but it serves no real purpose in the current crisis. Closer budgetary scrutiny is a red herring.
TREATY CHANGE
Treaty change is quite impossible in a useful timeframe -furthermore, the ratification process will introduce a new aspect of uncertainty into an already volatile situation. In particular, the likelihood of the UK passing a referendum on closer economic cooperation with the dysfunctional Eurozone is remote. Significant treaty changes will lead us into a world of pitfalls that we must avoid. Treaty change is a red herring.
QUANTITATIVE EASING
I have been quite a fan of quantitative easing in the US and the UK. I have a long standing belief that a small amount of inflation is a very healthy thing as it prevents money hoarding and compels wealth to be invested productively and profitably. In short it prevents depressions. Quantitative easing involves the Central Bank printing money, and then using this new cash to purchase government debts. The new liquidity released into the system creates a stimulus and prevents deflation. In a highly leveraged economy (such as Ireland), deflation is the path to disaster.
Nonetheless, at present in the Eurozone, inflation is running at over 2%, so deflation is not a problem except in certain localities. This does not bode well for the consequences of QE.
However, this will not last for long as forced austerity is probably going to descend on the continent once national budgets are agreed in December. Inflation will likely tick downwards as austerity bites, and perhaps then Quantitative Easing can be used to ease the money supply and relieve the debts of Greece. Finally, it must be made clear that this is a once off, and we must convince markets, funds etc. that the next time there is a sovereign crisis in Europe, they will have to eat their losses. A first step towards this would be to prevent financial institutions from using sovereign bonds as Tier 1 capital. Increasing their risk exposure to these assets should concentrate minds.
However, that is not an end to it -Quantitative Easing poses particular problems in the Eurozone. As it is a common currency, all holders of Euros across the Eurozone will lose wealth as the supply of money expands, while all indebted persons will benefit from the reduction in the value of their debts, and the proceeds from this money printing will be used to relieve the national debts of just a handful of highly indebted countries (or probably only Greece). This is undoubtedly unfair. It rewards personal and national bad behaviour and could be seen to give encouragement to the profligate.
However, unlike the other solutions currently being discussed -it will work. It is not a red herring, it is a real solution, and therefore, for all its lack of appeal, I support this approach. Combined with a coordinated austerity drive to balance Eurozone budgets, Quantitative Easing will increase the money supply, relieve the debt burden of Greece cause only modest, controllable inflation and save the Euro.
Thursday, November 24, 2011
Average debt of Irish worker
Loans to Irish residents outstanding (Sept 2011) 253bn
National debt (sept 2011) 163bn
Total 420bn in debt nationally.
1.8 million workers.
Therefore, the average Irish worker is supporting debts of 233,000 Euros. Around a quarter of a million euros each.
Bummer
National debt (sept 2011) 163bn
Total 420bn in debt nationally.
1.8 million workers.
Therefore, the average Irish worker is supporting debts of 233,000 Euros. Around a quarter of a million euros each.
Bummer
Sean Quinn -from hero to zero
Sean Quinn is rapidly consuming his stock of goodwill in this country. Yes, he may have kept his business interests near to home, but all this carry on with IBRC is unacceptable: claiming to have only €12K in the bank; filing for bankruptcy in the North; transferring assets out of his name. Who does he think he is? I've come to the conclusion that for all the plaudits he has won over the years -he's only a bum behind it all. Another of those puffed up assholes that seem to rule the roost everywhere in this country.
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